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ABSTRACT 
The recent flurry of security breaches have raised serious concerns about the security of 
data communication and storage. A promising way to enhance the security of the system 
is through physical root of trust, such as, through use of physical unclonable functions 
(PUF). PUF leverages the inherent randomness in physical systems to provide device 
specific authentication and encryption. 
In this thesis, first the design of a highly reliable resistive random access memory 
(RRAM) PUF is presented. Compared to existing 1 cell/bit RRAM, here the sum of the 
read-out currents of multiple RRAM cells are used for generating one response bit. This 
method statistically minimizes any early-lifetime failure due to RRAM retention degrada-
tion at high temperature or under voltage stress. Using a device model that was calibrated 
using IMEC HfOx RRAM experimental data, it was shown that an 8 cells/bit architecture 
achieves 99.9999% reliability for a lifetime >10 years at 125℃ . Also, the hardware area 
overhead of the proposed 8 cells/bit RRAM PUF architecture was smaller than 1 cell/bit 
RRAM PUF that requires error correction coding to achieve the same reliability. 
 Next, a basic security primitive is presented, where the RRAM PUF is embedded in the 
cryptographic module, SHA-256. This architecture is referred to as Embedded PUF or 
EPUF. EPUF has a security advantage over SHA-256 as it never exposes the PUF re-
sponse to the outside world. Instead, in each round, the PUF response is used to change a 
few bits of the message word to produce a unique message digest for each IC. The use of 
EPUF as a key generation module for AES is also shown. The hardware area requirement 
for SHA-256 and AES-128 is then analyzed using synthesis results based on TSMC 
65nm library. It is shown that the area overhead of 8 cells/bit RRAM PUF is only 1.08% 
 ii 
 
of the SHA-256 module and 0.04% of the AES-128 module. The security analysis of the 
PUF based systems is also presented. It is shown that the EPUF-based systems are re-
sistant towards standard attacks on PUFs, and that the security of the cryptographic mod-
ules is not compromised. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in electronics have enabled enormous successes in mobile devices and 
wearable medical devices on the one hand, and data storage and computing on the other 
hand. The unprecedented growth in the number, type and complexity of mobile devices 
has posed tremendous challenges in ensuring security and privacy during data communi-
cation and storage. In spite of all the security measures, the number of security breaches 
is on the rise. In November 2013, Target system was hacked and information of millions 
of credit and debit cards was stolen [1]; in August 2014, hundreds of private photographs 
of Hollywood celebrities were made public [2]; in November 2014, confidential data be-
longing to Sony Pictures Entertainment employees was leaked [3]. In 2014 alone, several 
Fortune 500 companies were hacked thereby raising significant concerns on the security 
of cloud data storage [4]. In 2017, it is expected that even in enterprise programs, half of 
the employees will bring their own personal devices to work, presenting the most radical 
change to the culture of mobile computing in decades [5].   
To enhance the security of the system techniques based on physical root of trust have 
been proposed.  Physical unclonable function or PUF has emerged as a promising way to 
provide physical root of trust. PUF is described as “an expression of an inherent and un-
clonable instance specific feature of a physical object such as a biometric feature like fin-
gerprint of a human being” [6]. Ideally, a PUF is a function whose output cannot be 
mathematically derived but purely depends upon the device physical properties. 
 In this thesis we focus on silicon PUF [7] which leverages the inherent randomness in 
the semiconductor manufacturing process to produce a unique output. The input to the 
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PUF is referred to as ‘challenge’ and its output is referred to as ‘response’ [7], as shown 
in Figure 1. To use PUF as a successful security primitive, a high degree of uniqueness 
among the PUF instances has to be achieved. In other words, the same challenge should 
produce different responses in different ICs, i.e., Inter-Hamming distance should be high 
[8]. At the same time, the PUF should be highly reliable, i.e., it should produce the same 
response for the same challenge (Intra-Hamming Distance should be zero) across various 
temperature, voltage and aging scenarios [8].   
PUF
Challenge Response
 
Figure 1: Basic PUF Operation 
Based on the number of challenge response pairs (CRPs), PUFs are classified as weak 
PUFs and strong PUFs. PUFs having a large number of CRPs are termed as strong PUFs, 
whereas PUFs having a small number of CRPs are defined as weak PUFs [9]. Since weak 
PUFs have limited number of CRPs, they cannot be used for authentication. Due to their 
small size, the attacker is assumed to have limited access to tamper the device making 
them more resistant towards invasive attacks. In contrast, strong PUFs have large number 
of CRPs and can be used for authentication. But due to their large structure, they are 
more vulnerable to invasive attacks.   
There are several implementations of PUFs, the most common being delay-based PUFs 
and memory PUFs. The arbiter PUF is a delay-based silicon PUF where the difference in 
the delay of the two paths is used to determine whether the output is a 0 or a 1 [10-11]. It 
is typically implemented with multiple switches, where the number of switches is equal 
to the number of challenge bits. While this PUF is easy to implement, it can be character-
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ized by a linear delay model and the output response can be predicted [12-13]. To add 
non-linearity, XOR arbiter PUF [14] and lightweight arbiter PUF [15] have been intro-
duced. 
Memory-based PUFs are typically based on SRAMs. Here the output response of the cir-
cuit depends upon the startup values of the cross coupled inverters of a 6T SRAM cell 
[9]. Recently, emerging non-volatile memory-based PUFs have been proposed, e.g. the 
resistive RAM (RRAM) (also referred to as memristor) [16-22]. The RRAM PUF has the 
advantage of nanoscale dimension, compatibility with CMOS and high retention proper-
ty.   
 PUFs are mainly used for authentication and key generation [14] as described below.  
 Authentication 
As PUFs are based on manufacturing variation and provides a unique identity to an IC, 
they can be used for authentication. For authentication, the verifier stores the CRPs of the 
PUF in a database during enrollment phase.  To check the authenticity of an IC, he selects 
a challenge whose response has been previously recorded but has never been used. He 
also obtains the response from the IC containing PUF. If the response from the chip 
matches (i.e., is close enough to) the previous recorded response, then the chip is success-
fully verified. This method is described in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Overview of PUF based authentication 
 If a strong PUF is used, the system has a larger CRP space but the PUF is more vulnera-
ble to modeling attacks [12-13]. Lightweight arbiter PUF, XOR arbiter PUF etc. alleviate 
some of these problems but these too are susceptible to machine learning attacks [12-13]. 
Conversely if a weak PUF [7] is used, then the system is immune to hardware probing 
attacks [12], but the CRP space is quite small and such a PUF cannot be used for authen-
tication.   
Several approaches have been proposed to hide the CRPs from the adversary at the ex-
pense of higher hardware cost. These include control PUF [23], where a strong PUF is 
used in conjunction with a cryptographic hash function, logically reconfigurable PUF 
[24] which uses an additional nonvolatile memory for reconfiguration, and reverse fuzzy 
extractor PUF [25] which uses helper data generator on top of the hash function and 
strong PUF. 
 Key Generation 
PUFs can also be used for key generation. In this method a challenge is given to the PUF 
and its response is then passed through a cryptographic hash function. The cryptographic 
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hash function helps in getting a fixed length key with sufficient entropy. Figure 3 de-
scribes the process of key generation. 
PUF
Cryptographic 
Hash Function
ResponseChallenge Key
 
Figure 3: Overview of PUF for Key Generation 
For the architecture shown in Figure 3 to work properly, the Intra-Hamming distance of 
the PUF should be zero. This is because even a small change in its output response will 
cause a large variation in the output of cryptographic hash function resulting in a wrong 
key generation. To compensate for the errors in the output response, Error Correction 
Codes (ECC) have been proposed [14].  
For both key generation and authentication, cryptographic hash functions are used along 
with the PUF and so it is necessary for the PUF to be highly reliable. Designs have been 
proposed for a highly reliable PUF based on ring oscillator [26] and RRAM [20] but they 
do not guarantee 100% reliability.  
In the ECC based system, part of the response has to be used as helper data. Thus use of 
ECC not only increases the hardware overhead but also reduces the entropy of the sys-
tem. Such a system is vulnerable to non-invasive attacks which leverage the information 
leaked by helper data [27].  
 Thesis Contributions 
In this thesis we propose the design of a highly reliable RRAM PUF which does not re-
quire ECC to guarantee its reliability. For the PUF implementation, we choose RRAM 
[15-21] because of its great scalability (<10nm), significant variability and superior com-
patibility with CMOS technology [28]. The initial resistance distribution of the RRAM 
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cells (which leverages the intrinsic variations in a RRAM device) is taken as a random-
ness source for entropy. Based on comparisons with a reference current, the cells in the 
RRAM array are self-programmed into a bimodal distribution with sufficiently large re-
sistance ratio. However, the resistance ratio may degrade with time due to operation at 
elevated temperature or due to read disturbance.  To achieve 100% reliability, we propose 
an architecture where each PUF response bit is represented by multiple RRAM cells 
physically wired in parallel. This method reduces the probability of an early life failure of 
a PUF response bit by adding redundancy. We have analyzed this method by representing 
each PUF bit by 2 cells, 4 cells and 8 cells in parallel. Using RRAM device models cali-
brated with IMEC HfOx RRAM experimental data, we show that when each bit is repre-
sented by 8 parallel RRAM cells, we achieve < 10−6 Intra-Hamming distance (or 
>99.9999% reliability) for a lifetime >10 years at 125°C.  
SHA-256PUF
Input
Message
Message
Digest
 
Figure 4: Embedded PUF: PUF embedded in SHA-256 datapath 
We then present Embedded PUF (EPUF) which consists of an RRAM PUF embedded 
inside a SHA-256 [29] module as shown in Figure 4. SHA-256 belongs to the SHA2 fam-
ily of cryptographic hash function which is widely used in security protocols. It consists 
of 64 rounds, where in each round (t) two parameters change: the 32 bit 𝑊𝑡 which is a 
function of the input message and 𝐾𝑡  which is a constant. In EPUF, the RRAM PUF re-
sponse is used to change 2 bits of 𝑊𝑡 in each round. Since the change does not affect the 
evaluation method, the resistance of SHA-256 to cryptoanalytic attacks is not compro-
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mised. The RRAM PUF has to be highly reliable as even a 1 bit change in the PUF char-
acteristic will result in a 50% Hamming distance in the output response. The proposed 
RRAM PUF based on 8cells/bit meets this requirement.  
EPUF design has the following advantages: 
1. High Security: EPUF has a large CRP space even though it is based on an RRAM-
based weak PUF. Since the PUF responses are not exposed to the communication 
channel, it is immune to modeling attacks. Use of the RRAM PUF makes it more se-
cure against semi-invasive attacks compared to an SRAM PUF. In addition, EPUF 
has a security level of 28x64 for random guessing attacks. 
2. Low Area: The hardware overhead is due to the small RRAM array and other simple 
circuitry for integrating the RRAM-based PUF inside the hash module. Also as 
EPUF is based on an RRAM-based PUF which is very robust, there is no need for 
any error correction circuits. We show that the proposed multiple cell per bit RRAM 
PUF has lower area overhead compared to the one cell per bit RRAM PUF that re-
quires Hamming code based ECC. 
We also explain the use of EPUF as a key generation unit for AES-128 [30] which is 
used for data encryption. We synthesized EPUF and the AES module using TSMC 65nm 
library and calculated their area after doing place and route in Cadence Encounter 10.1. 
We see that the RRAM PUF area overhead is very small. For instance, it is only 1.08% of 
SHA-256 area and 0.04% of AES-128 area. 
 Thesis Organization 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Background information of different types 
of PUF and their properties are discussed in Chapter 2. Information about the architecture 
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of SHA-256 and AES-128 is explained in Chapter 3. Architecture, simulation results and 
hardware overhead of a highly reliable RRAM PUF are presented in Chapter 4. The syn-
thesis results for EPUF and AES-128, along with the security analysis of the complete 
system, are presented in Chapter 5. The conclusion and future work are included in Chap-
ter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2  
Background: Physical Unclonable Function 
 Basics of PUF and its Properties 
Physical Unclonable Function or PUF is a security primitive that leverages the inherent 
randomness in the physical systems (e.g. the semiconductor manufacturing process) to 
produce unique responses (outputs) corresponding to challenges (inputs) [8]. It is also 
known as a physical one-way function as it is easy to compute but hard to invert. 
Based upon the number of challenge response pairs (CRPs), the PUF are classified as 
strong PUFs or weak PUFs. Strong PUFs have large CRPs and are used for authentica-
tion; examples include arbiter PUF, ring oscillator PUF, etc.  Weak PUFs have limited 
CRPs and are mainly used for key generation along with cryptographic modules. SRAM 
PUF and RRAM PUF are examples of weak PUF.    
A PUF has the following properties: 
1. Reproducibility: - Reproducibility means that response resulting from evaluating the 
same challenge on the same PUF instance should be similar i.e. the Intra-Hamming dis-
tance between the responses of the PUF should be negligible [8]. This is a very important 
property especially when PUF is used with cryptographic functions since even a small 
change in the response of the PUF will result in a large Hamming distance in the final 
output. This property should be checked across various voltage and temperature corners, 
as PUF response depends on the variability of the device and that variability can change 
across different process corners. 
2.  Uniqueness: - Uniqueness means responses resulting from evaluating the same chal-
lenge on different PUF instances should not be similar i.e. the Inter-Hamming distance 
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between different instances of PUF for the same challenge should be high [8]. This prop-
erty is important in terms of security since if an attacker is able to predict the characteris-
tics of PUF on one device, he will not be able to do that for other devices.  
3. Identifiabilty: - If the PUF satisfies both reproducibility and uniqueness it makes it 
identifiable [8].  
4.  Unpredictability: - A PUF is said to be unpredictable if even after the knowledge of a 
large set of CRPs, the adversary is not able to predict the response for any random chal-
lenge [8]. This property is advantageous while performing authentication because if the 
PUF is not unpredictable, then an adversary can predict the outcome of a challenge based 
on a previously recorded response. 
5. Mathematical Unclonability: -A PUF should be mathematically unclonable i.e. based 
on its previously recorded CRPs, the adversary should not be able to create a mathemati-
cal model for it [8]. This can be interpreted as the resistance of the PUF to machine learn-
ing attacks [12-13].  
 Types of PUFs 
There are three major categories of PUF: Non electronic PUF, electronic PUF and silicon 
PUF. The non-electronic PUFs are built using non-electronic technologies or materials, 
for example optical PUF [31-32] which is based on random reflection of scattering char-
acteristics of the optical medium.  Electronic PUFs are built using the electronic charac-
teristics of material such as resistance, capacitance and inductance values; an LC PUF 
[33] is an example of an electronic PUF. The third category is silicon PUF [7] which are 
integrated electronic circuits exhibiting PUF behavior embedded in a silicon chip. In this 
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work we focus on silicon based PUF. The two major type of silicon PUFs are delay-based 
PUF and memory-based PUF. 
2.2.1 Delay-Based PUF 
In a delay-based PUF, the difference in the delay of the two paths is used to determine 
whether the response is low or high. It is considered as a strong PUF due to large number 
of CRPs and is mainly used for authentication of ICs. Next we describe several delay-
based PUFs.  
2.2.1.1 Arbiter PUF  
The arbiter PUF [10-11] is a delay-based silicon PUF. An arbiter PUF consists of series 
of switches, where the number of switches is equal to the number of challenge bits. The 
arbiter decides whether the output is a 1 or 0 depending upon which path is faster. Figure 
5 describes a simple arbiter PUF. 
Arbiter
1 or 0
C2= 0 Cn-1= 0 Cn= 1C1=0
Challenge   
Figure 5: Arbiter PUF 
The main disadvantage of the arbiter PUF is the simplicity of its model. The attacker can 
characterize the arbiter as a linear delay model and therefore can predict the output re-
sponse of the PUF [12-13]. To add non linearity to the arbiter PUF, variants such as XOR 
arbiter PUF and lightweight arbiter PUF have been introduced. 
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2.2.1.2 XOR Arbiter PUF 
The XOR arbiter PUF [14] has non linearity and so cannot be characterized using a linear 
delay model. The n-XOR arbiter PUF consists of n different arbiter PUFs in parallel; the 
outputs are XORed to get a one bit response [34]. Unfortunately, machine learning can be 
used to model this type of PUF.  
2.2.1.3 Lightweight Arbiter PUF 
Lightweight arbiter PUF was introduced in [15]. It resembles the XOR arbiter PUF as it 
consists of n parallel chain of switches whose outputs are XORed to get one bit response. 
While in a XOR arbiter PUF, the same challenge is given to all the parallel stages, in a 
lightweight arbiter PUF, a different challenge is given to each parallel stage; these chal-
lenges are derived from one fixed challenge. In addition, arbiters are used in an interme-
diate stage to generate a challenge bit for some of the intermediate switches as shown in 
Figure 6. In spite of significant hardware overhead, this PUF can also be modelled by 
machine learning with the help of side channel information [35-36] 
C1=0
Arbiter
C2= 0 Cn= 1
1 or 0
Feed Forward 
Arbiter 
Challenge 
Bits
 
Figure 6: Lightweight Arbiter PUF 
 13 
 
2.2.1.4 Ring Oscillator PUF 
Ring oscillator PUF [37] is made up of multiple ring oscillators as shown in Figure 7. 
Each ring oscillator is a simple circuit that oscillates with a particular frequency. Due to 
manufacturing variations, each ring oscillator oscillates with a slightly different frequen-
cy. In order to generate a fixed number of bits, a fixed sequence of oscillator pairs is se-
lected, and their frequencies are compared to generate an output bit. The output bits gen-
erated by the same sequence of oscillator pair, vary from chip to chip. Given that oscilla-
tors are identically laid out, the frequency differences are determined by manufacturing 
variations and an output bit is equally likely to be one or zero if random variations domi-
nate. Ring Oscillator PUFs are also vulnerable to machine learning attacks because of 
their linear structure [12][27].  
Another issue with delay-based PUF is reliability.  Architectures have been proposed to 
make them highly reliable [26] but none of them guarantee 100% reliability.   
N  
Oscillators
>?
Counter
Counter
MUX
Output
0 or 1
Input    
Figure 7: Ring Oscillator PUF 
2.2.2 Memory-Based PUF 
To increase the reliability of the system, memory-based PUFs have been introduced. 
They are considered as weak PUFs due to the number limited CRPs. The memory-based 
PUF is mainly used for key generation along with cryptographic hash functions as dis-
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cussed in [14]. Error Correction Code (ECC) mechanism is typically required in order to 
generate the same key, as no errors can be tolerated at the input of the hash function.  
2.2.2.1 SRAM PUF 
SRAM-based PUF is one of the most commonly used memory-based PUFs [9]. The out-
put response of the SRAM PUF depends upon the startup values of the cross coupled in-
verters, as shown in Figure 8. The startup values differ across different ICs due to the 
manufacturing variations. Methods have been proposed to increase the reliability of 
SRAM PUF by creating a mismatch between the length and threshold voltage of NMOS 
in the cross coupled inverters. Unfortunately the system still does not achieve Intra-
Hamming distance of 0% [38].   
P N
Sense
Amplifier
Gate Length
Mismatch
6-T SRAM
 
Figure 8: SRAM-based PUF 
 
2.2.2.2 RRAM PUF 
Resistive random access memory (RRAM/ReRAM) is a non-volatile memory whose 
structure is a metal/oxide/metal stack as shown in Figure 9. It can be integrated at the in-
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terconnect levels on top of CMOS circuits and are generally used as a cross point array 
structure [39] or as a 1T1R (1 transistor 1 resistor) structure [40]. The RRAM differenti-
ates between a high resistance state (HRS, or “0”, or off-state) and a low resistance state 
(LRS, or “1”, or on-state) based upon the tunneling gap between the electrode and tip of 
the residual filaments that are made of oxygen vacancies. Despite being more reliable 
than the other PUFs, RRAM PUFs cannot guarantee 100% reliability, as shown in section 
4.3.   
Active Electrode
Inert Electrode
Oxygen 
Vacancy
Residual
Filaments 
g
L
 
Figure 9: Basic structure of an RRAM cell with two electrodes and oxide in between [41] 
2.2.3 Summary of PUFs 
Table I summarizes the properties of the different PUFs. Even though the PUF construc-
tions satisfies the properties of reproducibility and uniqueness up to a certain extent, they 
do not exhibit 0% Intra-Hamming distance or 50% Inter-Hamming distance. Also all the 
delay-based PUFs are prone to machine learning attacks. 
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 Arbiter 
PUF 
XOR 
Arbiter 
PUF 
Lightweight 
Arbiter PUF 
Ring Os-
cillator 
PUF 
SRAM 
PUF 
RRAM 
PUF 
Reproducibility Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Uniqueness Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Identifiabilty Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Unpredictability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mathematical 
Unclonability 
No No No No NA NA 
Table I: Summary of the PUF properties 
 Attacks on PUFs 
Some of the common non-invasive security attacks on PUFs are as follows: 
1. Replay Attack: This attack is a cause of concern when the PUFs are used for authenti-
cation [6]. In this attack, the adversary can use a previously used CRP for false authenti-
cation. To prevent this attack, the PUF should have a large CRP space so that the verifier 
has an option to never use a previously used CRP.   
2. Chosen Challenge Attack: In this attack, the correlation between different CRPs is ex-
ploited [6]. The attacker tries to model the PUF by changing one bit of the challenge at a 
time and track the variations in the response of the PUF. To prevent this attack, the PUF 
should satisfy the unpredictability property. 
3. Machine Learning Attack: In this attack, the adversary tries to build a mathematical 
model of the PUF based on previously recorded CRPs [12-13]. To increase the resistance 
against such attacks, nonlinearities are added into the PUF architecture but it affects the 
reproducibility property of the PUF. Also machine learning attacks have been shown to 
be effective against highly nonlinear PUFs as well. Machine learning attacks along with 
the side channel information can be used to model the PUF at a much faster rate.  
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In Chapter 4 we describe a RRAM-based PUF which is shown to be immune against 
these standard attacks.  
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CHAPTER 3  
 Background: SHA-256 and AES-128 
 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 256 
Cryptographic hash functions [42] has been traditionally used for digital signature, public 
key encryption etc. They are also used to hash the PUF response so that it is in not ex-
posed to the outside world [23]. A cryptographic hash function has the following proper-
ties [42]. 
1. Pre-image Resistant: - Pre-image resistant property defines the one way nature of the 
hash function. It states that if there is an output message digest h of a hash function, 
then it should be difficult to find any message m such that  h = hash(m).  
2. Second pre-image Resistant: - A cryptographic hash function is said to be second pre-
image resistant if for a given input message 𝑚1 and its output message digest 
(hash(𝑚1)) it is difficult to find a different input message 𝑚2 such that hash(𝑚1) = 
hash(𝑚2).  
3. Collision Resistant:- A cryptographic hash function is said to be collision resistant if 
an adversary is not able to find two different input messages 𝑚1and 𝑚2 such that 
hash(𝑚1) = hash(𝑚2).  
A cryptographic hash function should be immune towards attacks on its basic properties 
and should have minimum hardware and computational overhead. Earlier cryptographic 
hash functions such as MD5 and SHA1 have been proven to be vulnerable against crypto-
analytic attack on their collision resistance property and therefore we have chosen SHA-
256 [29] which belongs to the SHA2 family for our implementation. SHA-256 has an 
output message digest (output message length) of 256 bits and operates on a word size of 
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32 bits. The hardware architecture for SHA-256 is based on Merkle- Damgard construc-
tion [43] as shown in Figure 10.  
A FDC E HGB
A FDC E HGB
Ch
Σ1
Ma
Σ0
+
+ +
+
+
+
Wt
Kt
 
Figure 10:  Merkel-Damgard Architecture of SHA-256  
There are 64 rounds in SHA-256.  Registers A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H  are loaded with predeter-
mined 32 bit constants 𝐻0 to 𝐻7 as shown in Table II; their values get updated in every 
round during the computation. The computations are defined by the following equations 
 𝐶ℎ(𝐸, 𝐹, 𝐺) =(𝐸 ∧ 𝐹) ⨁(¬𝐸 ∧ 𝐺)                                                                              (3.1) 
𝑀𝑎(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶) = (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵)⨁(𝐴 ∧ 𝐶)⨁(𝐵 ∧ 𝐶)                                                                (3.2) 
 ∑ (𝐴)0  = (𝐴 ⋙ 2) ⊕ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐶)⨁(𝐵 ∧ 𝐶)                                                                    (3.3) 
 ∑ (𝐸)1  = (𝐸 ⋙ 6) ⊕ (𝐸 ⋙ 11)⨁(𝐸 ⋙ 25)                                                          (3.4) 
The addition performed here is modulo 232  and is represented by +  in Figure 10, i.e., 
the final carry is dropped after performing the addition. 
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Initial Constants Values (Hexadecimal) 
𝐻0 0x6a09e667  
 
𝐻1 0xbb67ae85  
    
𝐻2 0x3c6ef372  
    
𝐻3 0xa54ff53a 
 
𝐻4 0x510e527f  
    
𝐻5 0x9b05688c  
    
𝐻6 0x1f83d9ab  
 
𝐻7 0x5be0cd19 
 
Table II: The initial constants values used in SHA-256 computation 
The 𝑊𝑡 register shown in Figure 10 is of 32 bits and is computed in every round t. To 
compute 𝑊𝑡, first the input message is converted to a length of 512 bits as follows. If 
length of the input message is L, a 1 is appended after the message and k zeroes are ap-
pended after that such that L+1+k=448. To make the total width 512 bits, the remaining 
512- 448= 64 bits are obtained by representing the value of L in binary. These 512 bits 
are used as 𝑊𝑡 for the first 16 rounds. To compute 𝑊𝑡 for round number 17 to 64 the fol-
lowing equation is used   
                                        Wt=𝜎1 (Wt−2)+ Wt−7+ 𝜎0(Wt−15)+Wt−16                          (3.5) 
where 𝜎0 and 𝜎1 are constants for SHA-256. Previously computed  𝑊𝑡 values are multi-
plied by these constants to get the current value of  𝑊𝑡 as shown in equation 3.5.  
The round constant 𝐾𝑡 is also of 32 bits and have the predefined values provided by NIST 
given in [29]. 
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All the values of 𝐾𝑡 satisfies the following properties:   
 The value of round constants should be pairwise distinct  
 The round constant values should not be too symmetric. 
In this thesis we have kept the original architecture of SHA-256 and introduced an em-
bedded PUF in its data path as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 Security Analysis of SHA-256 
As the basic structure of SHA-256 is kept unchanged, its immunity against crypto-
analytic attacks on its properties namely, pre-image resistance, second pre-image re-
sistance and collision resistance, remains the same [44]. So far, no crypto-analytic attack 
or side channel attack has been able to break these properties when all 64 rounds are 
computed. 
 Advance Encryption Standard (AES) 128 
The Advance Encryption Standard (AES) also known as Rijndael, is a specification for 
encryption given by NIST [30]. It is a symmetric block cipher as it maps plaintext blocks 
to cipher text blocks and the same key is used for both encryption and decryption. The 
size of both the plaintext and cipher text blocks is 128 bits in AES. In this thesis we focus 
on AES-128 which requires the cipherkey also to be of 128 bits.  
A data block of 16 bytes in AES is referred to as a state. Operations in AES are per-
formed on basic units of 8 bits, one byte. All bytes are interpreted as elements of the fi-
nite field GF (28 ). This ensures that the results of all multiplications and additions also 
are elements of the same finite field.  
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Figure 11: Block diagram representing complete flow of AES-128 [30]  
AES-128 consists of 10 rounds of operation. There are four basic operations used in 
AES: 
1. AddRoundKey 
2. ShiftRows  
3. MixColumns  
4. Sub Bytes 
The first round only consists of AddRoundKey step; the intermediate rounds from 2 to 9 
consist of all the four steps and the final round consists of all the steps except the 
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MixColumns step. Figure 11 gives an overview of how encryption is performed. The 
original cipherkey of 128 bits is expanded so that each round of operation can operate on 
128 bits of expanded key as described in section 3.3.5 .The details of all the rounds are 
given from section 3.3.1 to section 3.3.4. 
3.3.1 AddRoundKey 
In AddRoundKey step, each byte in the state is XOR’ed with a corresponding byte in the 
expanded key as shown in Figure 12. The expanded key is derived from the cipherkey 
according to the key schedule algorithm described in section 3.3.5. 
a00 a01 a02
a10 a11
a20 a21 a22
a03
a13
a23
a30 a31 a32 a33
b00 b01 b02
b10 b11
b20 b21 b22
b03
b13
b23
b30 b31 b32 b33
k00 k01 k02
k10 k11
k20 k21 k22
k03
k13
k23
k30 k31 k32 k33
=
a12 k12 b12
 
Figure 12: AddRoundKey Step in AES-128 [45] 
3.3.2 SubBytes  
The SubBytes operation substitutes the state, one byte at a time, using a substitution box 
known as the Rijndael S-box. Figure 13 illustrates the SubBytes operation. The operation 
provides the non-linear property of the cipher which is crucial for protection against dif-
ferential and linear cryptanalysis [46]. 
a00 a01 a02
a10 a11 a12
a20 a21 a22
a03
a13
a23
a30 a31 a32 a33
b00 b01 b02
b10 b11 b12
b20 b21 b22
b03
b13
b23
b30 b31 b32 b33
S-Box
 
Figure 13: SubBytes step in AES-128 [30] 
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3.3.3 ShiftRows 
In ShiftRows operation, each row of the state is subjected to a different order of rotational 
left shift. Figure 14 illustrates the ShiftRows operation in detail where the row 0 is not 
subjected to any shift; row 1, row 2 and row 3 and shifted by a rotational left shift of 1, 2 
and 3, respectively. This step introduces inter column diffusion to the algorithm which 
provides resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis [46].  
a00 a01 a02
a10 a11
a20 a21 a22
a03
a13
a22
a30 a31 a32 a33
a12
a00 a01 a02
a11
a20 a21a22
a03
a13
a23
a30 a31 a32a33
a12
Rotational Left Shift by 2
Rotational Left Shift by 3
a10Rotational Left Shift by 1
 
Figure 14: ShiftRows step in AES-128 [30] 
3.3.4 MixColumns 
 MixColumns performs a transformation of the state, column by column. Each column is 
interpreted as a polynomial with coefficients in GF (28) and is then multiplied by modulo 
𝑥4 + 1 with a fixed polynomial c(x) = {03}𝑥3 + {01}𝑥2 + {01}𝑥 + {02}. This operation 
can be written as the matrix multiplication given in Equation 3.6. Figure 15 illustrates the 
MixColumn operation. 
                                             
[
 
 
 
 
𝑏0,𝑗
𝑏1,𝑗
𝑏2,𝑗
𝑏3,𝑗]
 
 
 
 
 = [
2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2
] [
𝑎0,𝑗
𝑎1,𝑗
𝑎2,𝑗
𝑎3,𝑗
]                                           (3.6) 
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Figure 15: MixColumn step in AES-128 [45] 
3.3.5 Key Expansion Algorithm 
The key expansion algorithm [30] is used to derive the expanded key from the original 
cipher key K. In this algorithm, the number of columns in a state is denoted by 𝑁𝑏, the 
number of rounds is denoted by 𝑁𝑟 and the number of columns in the cipher key is denot-
ed by 𝑁𝑘. For AES-128, the value of 𝑁𝑏, 𝑁𝑟 and 𝑁𝑘 is 4, 10 and 4, respectively. The key 
expansion generates a total of 𝑁𝑏 (𝑁𝑟 + 1) words: the algorithm requires an initial set of 
𝑁𝑏 words, and each of the 𝑁𝑟 rounds requires 𝑁𝑏words of key data. The resulting key 
schedule consists of a linear array of 4-byte words, denoted w[i], with i in the range 0 ≤ i 
< 𝑁𝑏(𝑁𝑟 + 1).The expansion of the input key into the key schedule proceeds according to 
the pseudo code shown in Figure 16.  
In Figure 16, SubWord() is a function that takes a four-byte input word and applies the S-
box to each of the four bytes to produce an output word. The function RotWord () takes a 
word [𝑎0, 𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3] as input, performs a cyclic permutation, and returns the word 
[𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3 ,𝑎0]. The round constant word array, Rcon[i], contains the values given by  
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Figure 16: Key Expansion Algorithm [30] 
[𝑥𝑖−1, {00}, {00}, {00}], with 𝑥𝑖−1 being power of x (x is denoted as {02}) in the field 
GF (28). From Figure 16, it can be seen that the first 𝑁𝑘 words of the expanded key are 
filled with the Cipher Key. Every following word, w[i], is equal to the XOR of the previ-
ous word, w [i-1], and the word 𝑁𝑘 positions earlier, w [i-𝑁𝑘]. For words in positions that 
are a multiple of 𝑁𝑘, a transformation is applied to w [i-1] prior to the XOR, followed by 
an XOR with a round constant, Rcon[i]. This transformation consists of a cyclic shift of 
KeyExpansion (byte key [4*𝑁𝑘], word w [𝑁𝑏*(Nr+1)], 𝑁𝑘) 
begin 
   word temp 
   i = 0 
   while (i < 𝑁𝑘) 
     w[i] = word(key[4*i], key[4*i+1], key[4*i+2], key[4*i+3]) 
     i = i+1 
   end while 
   i = 𝑁𝑘 
 while (i < 𝑁𝑏 * (𝑁𝑟 +1)] 
    temp = w[i-1] 
    if (i mod 𝑁𝑘 = 0) 
       temp = SubWord(RotWord(temp)) xor Rcon[i/𝑁𝑘] 
    else if (𝑁𝑘 > 6 and i mod 𝑁𝑘 = 4) 
       temp = SubWord(temp) 
    end if 
    w[i] = w[i-𝑁𝑘] xor temp 
    i = i + 1 
  end while 
end 
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the bytes in a word (RotWord ()), followed by the application of a table lookup to all four 
bytes of the word (SubWord ()). 
 Security Analysis of AES-128 
AES-128 has been shown to be immune against non-invasive linear and differential 
cryptanalysis attacks [47]. However side channel attacks, which are based on the side 
channel information extracted from the physical implementation, are still of concern. The 
side channel information may consist of output timing, power consumption and electro-
magnetic radiation.  
There are two main types of side channel attacks (SCA) [48]: Simple SCA and Differen-
tial SCA. Simple SCA depends on the encryption process and individual bits of the secret 
key. This kind of attack requires detailed information about the encryption device and can 
be prevented easily. Timing attack is an example of Simple SCA. Differential side chan-
nel attacks are more complex and effective than Simple SCA [49]. These attacks try to 
extract a correlation between the data and the instantaneous side channel leakage of the 
cryptographic device. As this correlation is very small, statistical methods such as Pear-
son correlation coefficient are used. In a differential SCA, the adversary builds a specula-
tive model of the device and breaks the target (intermediate result related to the secret 
key) into small parts, usually of size 8 bits to perform the attack. The value of each part is 
then guessed and the results are statistically analyzed.  
Differential power analysis (DPA) attack [49] is a popular differential SCA. In AES-128, 
DPA is done on either the initial round of computation or the last round of computation 
[50-52]. The attack on the initial round is more efficient, as the initial round consists of 
an XOR operation of the plaintext and the original key. If an adversary can extract the 
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key from the first operation itself, he can predict the key for the rest of the rounds as well 
[51]. Generating keys from the PUF does not add any complexity to this round; its vul-
nerability against DPA remains the same.  
The last round is also targeted for DPA because it does not have the Mixcolumn vertical 
diffusion step [51].  If an adversary is able to predict the final round key, he can predict 
the initial cipher key by reversing the key expansion algorithm. Adding PUF in the shift 
row operation can possibly increase the complexity of the final round and its resistance 
towards DPA attacks. This work is not presented in this thesis and is open to further re-
search. 
Additionally DPA attacks are done on the S-box substitution used in the SubBytes step. 
As the S-Box substitution is performed one byte at a time, the adversary can target each 
byte separately [53]. This attack can be repeated 16 times using the same power traces to 
get the 128 bit key. If successful, this attack reduces the random guess key search space 
from 2128 to 16x28 combinations. To prevent this, hardware architectures have been pro-
posed for S-box which show minimal power correlation with the operations performed 
[45]. Discussion of those architectures is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Other possible attacks on AES-128 are semi-invasive and invasive attacks on the key 
storage.  Photoemission attacks on SRAM memory can be used to detect the stored val-
ues. Passive probing attacks can be used to leak the key values in non-volatile memories. 
Generating keys from PUFs can possibly help in reducing these type of attacks. 
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CHAPTER 4  
Reliable RRAM PUF 
Since PUFs are used with cryptographic hash function for doing authentication as well as 
key generation, there is a need to guarantee a highly stable PUF output. Studies have 
been made to make PUFs highly reliable but none of them guarantee 100% reliability. 
Currently the only approach that has a 0% Intra-Hamming distance involves using ECC 
on PUF output. Such a scheme not only reduces the entropy of the PUF but compromises 
the security level of the system. In this chapter we present the architecture of a highly re-
liable RRAM based PUF which can guarantee a stable output without the use of ECC. 
 Basics of RRAM PUF 
RRAM is an emerging NVM candidate due to its simple structure, low programming 
voltage (<3 V), fast switching speed (<10 ns), high on/off ratio (>10×), excellent scalabil-
ity (<10 nm), good programming endurance (106-1012 cycles) and great compatibility 
with silicon CMOS technology [18]. It has large variability, making it challenging for use 
in some memory applications. Here we leverage this variability in designing an RRAM-
based PUF. Compared to other NVM candidates such as phase change memory (PCM), 
or spin-transfer-torque RAM (STT-RAM), RRAM has more stable resistance states and 
larger on/off resistance ratio (therefore, larger noise margin for better reliability). For ex-
ample, RRAM’s on/off resistance ratio can be as large as 10× ~ 100× (while STT-RAM’s 
on/off ratio is only ~ 2×). 
     The typical RRAM device structure is a metal/oxide/metal stack as shown in Figure 9, 
which can be integrated at the interconnect levels on top of the CMOS circuits. The 
RRAM differentiates between a high resistance state (HRS, or “0”, or off-state) and a low 
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resistance state (LRS, or “1”, or on-state) based upon the tunneling gap between the elec-
trode and tip of the residual filaments that are made of oxygen vacancies.  When the tun-
neling gap is large, the RRAM is in HRS and when the tunneling gap is very small, the 
RRAM is in LRS. Due to the stochastic nature of the atomistic processes, e.g., generation 
and annihilation of oxygen vacancies, the shape of the filaments varies from device to 
device, and even from programming cycle to cycle within one device. Owing to the tun-
neling mechanism, any atomistic change of the filaments results in significant variations 
in the resistances of the device, which provides sufficient entropy for the PUF applica-
tion.             
 Read and Retention Property    
To evaluate the RRAM’s reliability when it is used as PUF, we need to understand its 
failure mechanism, e.g. data retention at high temperature and read disturbance under 
voltage stress. To analyze its retention property, the RRAM cell is subjected to high tem-
perature baking. Over a period of time, oxygen vacancies in the oxide tend to diffuse 
thereby increasing the tunneling gap. As a result, the LRS cells shifts towards HRS. In 
addition, when the RRAM cell is frequently read, it suffers from read voltage disturb-
ance.  
       To evaluate the disturbance property of RRAM, a constant read voltage is applied 
across the cell, which causes the oxygen vacancies to migrate thereby causing a variation 
in its resistance. When a negative voltage is applied across the RRAM, the tunneling gap 
tends to be widened, leading to an increase in the resistance of the cell. A reverse phe-
nomenon happens when a positive voltage is applied across the RRAM.   
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 Prior Work on RRAM PUF 
Most of the prior work on RRAM PUF has focused on attaining a high level of unique-
ness. The method in [54] leverages a weak write mechanism on the RRAM PUF that re-
sults in an unpredictable logic state, thereby improving the uniqueness metric. Memris-
tor-based PUF, which depend upon the write time variability of the memristor device, 
was proposed in [55] [17]. The actual SET time was chosen to be close to the minimum 
SET time so that the probability of the output logic being high or low is 0.5.  
Recently the focus has shifted towards designing a highly reliable RRAM PUF. The 
method in [20] uses the bimodal distribution of RRAM and programs the RRAM cells 
such that 50% of the cells are in LRS and 50% in HRS. To split the cells into LRS and 
HRS state equally, an on chip voltage to digital converter and a median finding algorithm 
is used in [20]. Such a method has high overhead but still does not guarantee 100% relia-
bility. In this thesis we embed the PUF in cryptographic module to enhance the unique-
ness metric and propose a multi bit per cell architecture with minimal area overhead to 
achieve high reliability.   
 Modeling RRAM  
To assess the RRAM reliability, a physical device model [56-57] calibrated with IMEC 
HfOx RRAM experimental data [58-60], is used. In the model, the RRAM I-V relation-
ship is described by a tunneling mechanism with gap distance (g) as an internal state var-
iable, 
                                                     I = I0exp (-
g
g0
) sinh (
V
V0
)                                       (4.1)                      
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where I0, g0 and V0 are fitting parameters. The RRAM switching dynamics are represent-
ed via the following equations,  
                   
dg
dt
 = -v0 [exp (-
qEag
kT
) exp (
γa0
L
qV
kT
)  - exp (-
qEar
kT
) exp (-
γa0
L
qV
kT
)]                  (4.2) 
                                                            γ = γ0-β (
g
g1
)
3
                                                    (4.3) 
                                                          
dT
dt
+
T-T0
τth
 = 
|V×I|
Cth
                                                    (4.4) 
where dg/dt is the gap growth/dissolution velocity. L is the oxide thickness, 𝑎0 is the 
atomic hopping distance and γ is the g-dependent local field enhancement factor. v0, 𝛾0, 
β and g1 are fitting parameters. Equation (4.4) describes the heat conduction process 
where T is the local temperature of the conductive filaments, 𝑇0 is the ambient tempera-
ture, and 𝜏𝑡ℎ and 𝐶𝑡ℎ are the effective thermal time constant and thermal capacitance, re-
spectively.  
 Initial Programming and Architecture for a Highly Reliable RRAM PUF  
Our primary objective is to design a highly reliable PUF with large entropy. The re-
sistance distribution shown in Figure 17(a) illustrates the randomness that exists in the 
initial resistance of the as-fabricated RRAM cells in an array. This distribution represents 
the entropy source for the RRAM PUF. 
 A read voltage is applied across each RRAM cell and the current through it is measured. 
A reference current is chosen within the distribution. The cells which have current below 
the reference level are programmed into HRS and the others are programmed into LRS. 
Figure 17(b) shows the histogram after each cell is programmed into the LRS and HRS 
states. Allowing the reference current level to have some flexibility (instead of exactly in 
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the middle of the distribution as in [19]) saves a lot of additional hardware and calibration 
steps. However, this flexibility also causes the probability of each bit being 0 and 1 to be 
no longer 50%, which may reduce the inter Hamming distance among different PUFs. In 
applications where the PUF is used for key generation, this is acceptable since the PUF 
output is hashed using a cryptographic hash function which provides an inter Hamming 
distance of 50% to the whole system.    
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Figure 17 : (a) Initial distribution of resistances in an RRAM array, (b) Distribution after 
the cells are programmed into the LRS and HRS according to the reference. 
     After each cell is programmed into the LRS and HRS states, the window between the 
two states is sufficiently large. However, under high temperature conditions over a long 
period of operation, the resistance distribution of LRS tends to shift towards that of HRS. 
If there is overlap between LRS tail bits and HRS tail bits, then errors occur in the PUF 
output response. The criterion for reliability assessment in this work is that the PUFs out-
put should be reproducible for > 10 years (3×108 seconds) under military temperature 
condition of 125°C.  
     Figure 18(a) shows the PUF architecture when a single response bit is represented by 
one RRAM cell (baseline in this paper). To enhance the reliability of the PUF, we pro-
pose an architecture where a single response bit is represented by multiple RRAM cells 
connected in parallel, as shown in Figure 18(b). The multiple RRAM cells are physically 
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wired together to form one column output. This architecture statistically reduces the 
probability of an early life failure for a single PUF response bit. We further analyze this 
architecture for structures where a single bit is represented by 2 cells, 4 cells and 8 cells. 
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Figure 18 :  (a) Design of RRAM crossbar array where each PUF bit is represented by 
one RRAM cell, (b) Design of RRAM crossbar array where each PUF bit is represented 
by multiple (e.g. 2) RRAM cells. 
 Reliability Analysis of RRAM PUF  
For statistical analysis, we run 1 million Monte-Carlo (MC) simulations. We considered 
variations in the fitting parameters in the I-V characteristics (Equation 4.1), gap 
growth/dissolution velocity of the RRAM cell (Equation 4.2) and the local field en-
hancement factor (Equation 4.3). The variations have been chosen such that the resistance 
values remain in accordance with IMEC HfOx RRAM data. Table III  lists the parame-
ters that were varied along with their mean and sigma values. All simulations were per-
formed using MATLAB R2013a on a workstation (Intel i-7 2.4 GHz CPU with 8 cores 
and 256 GB RAM). The simulations took almost 300 hours to complete.  
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 Mean: µ Variance: σ/µ 
gap0_L 0.403 nm 3.5% 
gap0_H 1.367 nm 5% 
𝐼0 61.4 µA 5% 
𝑉0 0.43 V 5% 
𝑔0 0.275 nm 5% 
v0 300 m/s 10% 
γ
0
 16.5 2% 
       
Table III : Variations in the fitting parameters of I-V characteristics, local field 
enhancement factor and the gap dynamics of the RRAM model for Monte Carlo 
simulations 
4.6.1 Analysis of 1 cell architecture 
Figure 18 (a) shows the architecture when one PUF bit is represented by one RRAM cell. 
In this architecture, we define failure point as the read-out current value at which the 
sense amplifier cannot distinguish between the LRS and the HRS states. Specifically, for 
a single cell configuration, the failure point corresponds to the case when the LRS read-
out current drops to 3µA. 
4.6.1.1 Retention property 
When the RRAM PUF is not being used, the RRAM states should retain the values even 
under extreme temperature conditions. Figure 19 shows the simulated RRAM retention 
degradation without voltage bias at 125°C for 1000 MC runs. The LRS current decreases 
over time as the LRS resistance shifts towards the HRS. No failure is observed for 1000 
MC runs. However, as we increase the MC runs, we see that 3 cells among 1 million cells 
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fail before the 10-year lifetime, which gives an error percentage of 0.003% as shown in 
Table IV. 
 
Figure 19 : LRS read-out current drift of a single cell RRAM in retention mode for a 
period of 10 years (3×108 seconds) at 125°C. There are no failures in 1000 MC runs. 
4.6.1.2 Read disturbance property   
     Every time the response from the RRAM PUF is read, the RRAM cells undergo read 
disturbance. We perform simulations corresponding to a constant read stress of 104 sec-
onds which is equivalent to reading the RRAM cell 1012 times assuming the read pulse is 
10 ns. If the RRAM cell is read once every 0.3 ms, a constant stress of 104 seconds can 
be translated to a 10-year lifetime. Figure 20 shows the simulated RRAM read disturb-
ance with -0.3V read voltage at 125°C for 1000 MC runs. For 1 million MC runs, 17979 
cells fail before the 10-year lifetime, which gives an error percentage of 1.7979% as 
shown in Table III. An error rate of 1.7979% is unacceptable for key generation. To en-
hance the reliability, in the next section, we propose an architecture in which a single bit 
is represented by multiple RRAM cells in parallel.   
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Figure 20: LRS read-out current drift of a single RRAM cell when a constant read stress 
voltage of -0.3V is applied for a period of 104 seconds (which represents 1012 read 
cycles). There are 17 failures in 1000 MC runs. 
4.6.2 One PUF bit represented by multiple RRAM cells 
Here we analyze the retention and read disturbance properties in structures where a PUF 
bit is represented by 2 parallel RRAM cells, 4 parallel RRAM cells and 8 parallel RRAM 
cells. The concept behind this approach is that if multiple RRAM cells are wired in paral-
lel, the read-out current will be added up. Due to inherent variations, some cells may see 
their resistance increasing faster than the others. However, even if the current through 
that cell decreases earlier, the net sum current will still be above the reference current of 
the sense amplifier. The reference current value for each of the configurations is propor-
tional to the number of cells per bit. For a configuration with 2 parallel RRAM cells per 
bit, failure point is defined as the time when the net sum current drops to 6 µA. Similarly, 
for 4 parallel RRAM cells per bit, the threshold current value is 12 µA and for 8 parallel 
RRAM cells per bit, the threshold current is 24 µA. The simulation conditions such as 
125 °C and -0.3 V read voltage that are used for analyzing the single RRAM cell per bit, 
are applied here as well. 
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4.6.2.1 Retention property  
Table IV shows that the architecture with two RRAM cells in parallel has 0 error out of 1 
million MC runs for a duration of 10 years. Further increasing the number of RRAM cells 
in parallel to 4 and 8 also guarantees 10-year lifetime.  
 
Number of 
cells per bit 
 
Ref. Current for 
Failure 
Total Number of 
Failures 
Error  
1 3 µA 5 0.005% 
2 6 µA 0 0% 
4 12 µA 0 0% 
8 24 µA 0 0% 
 
Table IV : Total number of failures in 1 million MC runs under retention condition 
(125°C) for a 10-year lifetime. 
 
4.6.2.2 Read disturbance property   
Table V shows how the failure rates decrease as the number of RRAM cells per bit in-
creases. While the failure rate is 1.7% for the architecture with 1 RRAM cell per bit, the 
failure rate decreases to 0.1346% for the architecture with 2 RRAM cells per bit. The 
failure rate decreases further to 0.0014% for 4 RRAM cells per bit and becomes 0 for 8 
RRAM cells per bit. Thus there is no need for an ECC unit if each bit is represented by 8 
RRAM cells for a system with 10-year lifetime.  
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Total Number 
of  cells per bit 
Reference 
for Failure 
Total Number 
of Failures 
Error  
1 3 µA 17979 1.7979% 
2 6 µA 1346 0.1346% 
4 12 µA 14 0.0014% 
8 24 µA 0 0% 
 
Table V : Total number of failures in 1 million MC runs under read condition (-0.3V   
and 125°C) for a 10-year lifetime. 
 Hardware Overhead 
The area overhead of the proposed RRAM PUF and its peripheral circuitry is calculated 
using the NVSim simulator [61]. NVSim adopts analytical modules for NVM cells for 
circuit-level assessment and estimates the physical footprint of the array. Synthesis for 
Hamming (7,4) ECC and 6:64 decoder is done using design compiler and their area are  
calculated after doing place and route using Cadence Encounter 10.1. All estimations are 
done in the 65nm node. The area of Hamming (7, 4) ECC came to be 144 𝑢𝑚2 and its 
latency was 1ns. 
 We compare the two architectures: the proposed multiple-cell per bit where each PUF bit 
is represented by 8 parallel RRAM cells versus the one cell per bit architecture that em-
ploys Hamming (7, 4) ECC. We choose Hamming (7, 4) ECC even though the error is 
only 1.7979%, because there could be an error in 1 of the 4 bits that are read out in each 
round, and those error need to be corrected. With Hamming (7, 4) ECC data array of size 
64x4 increases to 64x7. Table VI shows the area estimations for the baseline RRAM ar-
ray (64x4) along with its peripheral circuitry (as shown in Figure 18(a)), 64x32 RRAM 
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array corresponding to 8 cells/bit architecture, 64x7 RRAM array corresponding to 1 
cell/bit architecture along with Hamming (7,4) ECC unit. 
Components Number of Compo-
nents Required  
Total Area (𝜇𝑚2) 
64x4 RRAM Array 1 4.327 
6:64 Decoder 1 232.254 
Sense Amplifier 4 4.815 
64x32 RRAM Array 1 34.956 
64x7 RRAM Array 1 7.571 
Hamming (7, 4) ECC 1 144.000 
Table VI : Area of different modules in the RRAM PUF based architecture 
The hardware overhead of the proposed architecture (8 cells per bit) and the conventional 
architecture (1 cell per bit with ECC) have been shown with respect to the baseline (1 cell 
per bit) in Table VII . With 8 cells per bit, the RRAM array has smaller overhead because 
the RRAM cell size is much smaller than that of the peripheral circuits. 
 Total Area (𝜇𝑚2) Area Overhead (%) 
RRAM  (1 cell/bit) 241.396 Baseline 
RRAM (1 cell/bit) + 
Hamming (7,4) ECC 
392.251 62.49 
RRAM    (8 cells/bit) 272.025 12.68 
Table VII:  Hardware overhead of different RRAM PUF implementation 
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CHAPTER 5  
Embedding RRAM PUF in Cryptographic Modules 
Embedded PUF (EPUF) is defined as embedding a PUF in the datapath of SHA-256. The 
advantage of such a scheme is the large CRP space which makes it suitable for authenti-
cation and key generation.  EPUF satisfies the uniqueness property since even if two de-
vices have a small difference in their PUF characteristics, the corresponding Hamming 
distance of the output messages will be large. In our proposed EPUF architecture, the 
PUF has an additional requirement of reproducibility of responses across different volt-
age and temperature conditions. If the response of the PUF varies by even one bit, the 
output will have a Hamming distance of almost 50% as it is embedded in a hash function. 
In such a case, the device cannot be authenticated or an incorrect key will be produced. 
Thus the PUF in an EPUF has to be implemented using a robust memory array such as 
the 8 cells/bit RRAM array as described in Chapter 4. 
 Architecture of Embedded PUF 
As discussed in Section 3.1, the SHA-256 architecture is based on Merkel Damgard con-
struction where 64 rounds of computation are needed to produce the output message di-
gest. In this work, we propose to embed the highly reliable RRAM PUF, described earli-
er, inside the SHA-256 hardware unit as shown in Figure 21.  
In each round t, the PUF response can be used to change the message word 𝑊𝑡 and/or the 
round constant 𝐾𝑡. Since the change does not affect the evaluation method for 𝑊𝑡 or the 
properties of  𝐾𝑡, the immunity of SHA-256 against the crypto-analytic attacks is not 
compromised.  
 42 
 
To decide on the number of bits that needs to be flipped, we have considered the impact 
on the security level of the system as well as the hardware cost. If only one bit of 𝐾𝑡 or 
𝑊𝑡 is changed, the number of brute force attacks that are required to crack this system is 
25𝑥64.This number changes to 28𝑥64 if two bits of 𝐾𝑡 or 𝑊𝑡 are changed. Since the hard-
ware overhead of changing 2 bits is not very high, we consider changing 2 bits in this 
work. 
Furthermore, we chose to modify 𝑊𝑡 over 𝐾𝑡. Modification of 𝐾𝑡 or 𝑊𝑡 would have re-
sulted in the same security level theoretically, in practice, modifying 𝑊𝑡 leads to higher 
security. This is because in a 𝑊𝑡 based system, even if the attacker is able to predict the 
message digest for one specific input message, he will not be able to successfully predict 
for another message without resorting to another round of attacks. 
SHA 256
 Computation 
Unit
t=1-63
Wt PUF
Input
Message
t=64 Message
Digest
 
Figure 21: Proposed architecture for EPUF. The value of Wt changes in every 
round based on the PUF response 
Figure 22 describes the proposed method where 2 bits of 𝑊𝑡 are inverted. 𝑊𝑡 is divided 
into two equal halves and 1 bit from the lower half and 1 bit from the upper half are cho-
sen to be inverted. This is implemented using two PUF arrays along with a decode cir-
cuitry. Since there are 64 rounds, the size of each of the PUF arrays is 4x64. In every 
round, one row of the PUF array is selected based on the round number. A 6:64 decoder 
is used to select a row in both the PUF arrays. Each of the PUF arrays gives a 4 bit output 
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which is then fed to a corresponding 4:16 decoder. The 2x16=32 bits are then XOR with 
32 bit 𝑊𝑡. The synthesis results for SHA-256 along with the PUF circuitry in the datapath 
is explained in section 5.2 and the security analysis of the system is presented in section 
5.3. 
PUF
4:16 
Decoder
4 16
15- 031-16
Message Word Wt
Modified Word Wt 
PUF
4:16 
Decoder
416
 
Figure 22: Implementation details for proposed scheme in which 2 bits of Wt  are 
inverted where the position of inversion is determined by the EPUF response. 
 Synthesis result for Embedded PUF 
The HDL code for SHA-256 was obtained from [62]. Synthesis was done using Design 
Compiler and place and route was performed using Cadence Encounter 10.1. TSMC 
65nm library was used to generate the final hardware. The output of the synthesized 
hardware was compared against the results obtained from [63]. The outputs are identical, 
thereby verifying the correctness of the hardware implementation.  
Timing: The clock period for the computation of one round was set at 5ns and the total 
latency to produce one message digest was found to be 320ns.  
Area: Figure 23 gives the image of the synthesized hardware after place and route. The 
total area of the SHA-256 module is 230.4𝜇𝑚*239.7𝜇𝑚 =55226.88𝜇𝑚2. The 8 cells/bit 
RRAM PUF has an area of 601.60𝜇𝑚2. Thus the hardware overhead of the RRAM PUF 
is only 1.08% of the existing SHA-256 module. 
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Figure 23: Hardware Implementation of SHA-256 
 Security Analysis of EPUF 
As the basic properties and architecture of SHA-256 are not changed, the resistance of 
EPUF against crypto-analytic attack remains the same. We further analyze the immunity 
of the EPUF architecture towards the following standard non-invasive attacks on PUFs.  
1. Replay attack: In a replay attack, the adversary can reuse previously used CRPs. To 
prevent this attack, the verifier never uses a CRP more than once and so to make this 
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scheme practical, the PUF needs to have a large CRP space. In our scheme, since the in-
put is fed to the hash function and the output is the message digest, the CRP is very large.  
2. Chosen challenge attack: In this attack, the adversary can just change one bit of the 
challenge at a time and can track the variations in the response to model the PUF. To pre-
vent this, the PUF should have a strict avalanche property, that is, even if one bit of the 
input message is changed, the probability of flipping each response bit should be 0.5. In 
the proposed design, changing one bit of the input message results in Hamming distance 
of 50%. So even if the chosen challenge attack is performed on the system, the effort the 
adversary has to make to extract the EPUF characteristic does not change. 
3. Machine learning attack: These attacks aim to predict the response of PUF for a ran-
domly chosen challenge based on previously recorded CRPs. Strong PUFs, whose CRPs 
can easily be extracted from the communication channel, have been proven to be vulner-
able against this type of attack [12-13]. In the proposed design, the CRPs of the PUF are 
never exposed to the communication channel; instead they are well embedded inside the 
hash module and thus the machine learning algorithms will not be able to model the 
EPUF. 
4. Random guessing attack: To analyze the probability of success of such an attack we 
assume that the attacker has the input message to the SHA as well as the output message 
digest. Also the attacker knows that the method is based on changing the bits in 𝑊𝑡. 
Since one bit out of lower 16 bits of 𝑊𝑡 and one bit from the upper 16 bits are inverted, 
there are  (16
1
) x(16
1
) different combinations for each round, and so the total number of 
attacks that needs to be performed in the worst case is 28𝑥64. 
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While doing the initial programming of the RRAM, we have not split the cells into low 
resistance and high resistance states with 50% probability unlike the approach in [10]. To 
analyze the effect of skewed distribution, we consider an extreme case in which only 
25% of the bits are 1 and the rest are 0. Thus one out of every 4 bits (instead of 16 bits) in 
a 64×4 array will be 1. As a result, the decoder will choose 1 out of 4 bits (instead of 1 
out of 16 bits) to perform the inversion. Thus, in each round, the number of different 
combinations is (4
1
)x(4
1
), and in 64 rounds, the total number of different combinations 
will be 264𝑥4  which is still a very large number. 
 EPUF used for Authentication 
In the proposed authentication scheme if the verifier wants to verify an IC with EPUF he 
needs to have access to the exact characteristics of the PUF that is embedded inside SHA. 
The verifier sends a message to the device to be authenticated. The device produces the 
hashed response of the message. As PUF characteristics vary in every device, each device 
has its unique response for a given message. The verifier then calculates the hashed re-
sponse based on the PUF characteristics stored in the database. If the calculated response 
matches the received response the device is successfully authenticated. This method is 
described in Figure 24.  
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Figure 24: EPUF used for authentication of IC  
 EPUF used for key generation in AES-128 
In this work we use EPUF as a key generation unit for AES-128.  
EPUF
AES 128 
Module
Key Encrypted 
Data
Input
Message
Challenge
 
Figure 25: EPUF used for key generation is AES-128 module 
Figure 25 shows the use of EPUF as a key generation unit for AES. In this architecture, 
challenge is given to EPUF for key generation. Since EPUF is based on SHA-256, it pro-
duces a 256 bit key output. As AES-128 only requires a 128 bit key, the remaining bits 
are ignored. The 128 bits are used as a cipher key for encryption, and the key generation 
algorithm discussed in section 3.5 can be used to produce expanded keys for all the 
rounds in AES-128.   
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 Synthesis result for AES-128 
The HDL code for AES-128 was obtained from [64]. The AES-128 design was synthe-
sized using Design Compiler, and place and route was performed using Cadence Encoun-
ter 10.1. TSMC 65nm library was used to generate the hardware implementation. To veri-
fy the correctness of the hardware implementation, the output of the synthesized hard-
ware was compared against the output from [65]. The two outputs were found to be the 
same, thereby confirming the hardware implementation was functionally correct.    
Timing: The clock period for the computation was set at 1ns. The total latency to produce 
128 bit encrypted data was 20ns. 
Area: Figure 26 gives the image of the hardware implementation after place and route in 
Cadence Encounter. The total area of the design is 1179𝜇𝑚*1179.2𝜇𝑚 =1390276.8𝜇𝑚2. 
Thus the area of the 8 cells/bit RRAM PUF is only 0.04% compared to the AES-128 
module. 
 Security Analysis of AES-128 having EPUF for Key Generation 
As the EPUF module is used for key generation, the security analysis presented in section 
5.3 for EPUF remains the same. Also the architecture of AES-128 is unchanged so its 
immunity towards cryptoanalytic attack is sustained. The advantage of generating keys 
from EPUF is that even if the adversary know the input challenge to EPUF, he will not be 
able to predict the key for the given challenge or a similar challenge with a minimum 
Hamming distance. 
Several invasive attacks have been shown on keys stored in a non-volatile memory. 
EPUF with an embedded RRAM PUF is immune towards invasive attacks due to its na-
noscale dimension. The scalability of RRAM has been proved to be less than 10 nm, thus 
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it is extremely difficult to directly probe such small cell using invasive techniques. Even 
if a single RRAM cell is probed, the atomistic changes in the defect density in the oxide 
are invisible even under high-resolution transmission electron microscopy. The only 
weak point is that RRAM’s characteristics may leak out if the sense amplifier’s outputs 
are invasively probed. Also compared to an SRAM PUF, RRAM PUF is more resistant 
towards semi invasive attacks. This is because RRAM is not expected to emit photons 
under photon emission analysis unlike the hot carriers in transistors of an SRAM cell 
[66]. 
 
Figure 26: Hardware Implementation of AES-128    
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CHAPTER 6 Conclusion and Future Work 
In this thesis we have described the use of PUF to enhance system security. We first pre-
sent the design of a highly reliable RRAM PUF based on a multiple cell per bit architec-
ture. Such an architecture can be embedded in cryptographic modules and do not require 
ECC to generate a stable output. We studied RRAM PUF architectures with 2 cells/bit, 4 
cells/bit and 8 cells/bit. Using a device model that was calibrated with IMEC HfOx 
RRAM experimental data [58-60], we showed that the architecture with 8 cells/bit has an 
endurance of 10 years under military conditions of 125°C and can sustain read disturb-
ance for 1012cycles. 
 Next we presented EPUF architecture in which the highly reliable RRAM PUF is em-
bedded in the SHA-256 datapath. The EPUF was also used in key generation module for 
AES-128. SHA-256 and AES-128 modules were synthesized using the TSMC 65nm li-
brary. It was found that the area overhead of 8 cell/bit RRAM PUF is only 1.08% and 
0.04%, of SHA-256 and AES-128, respectively. Finally, the security analysis of the com-
plete system was presented and it was shown that EPUF is resistant towards standard at-
tacks on PUFs and does not affect the security level of cryptographic modules against 
cryptoanalytic attacks. 
6.1 Future Work 
To enhance the security of the system, the next step can be device specific encryption. 
PUF can be embedded in AES datapath such that it does not affect the security criteria for 
encryption as defined by NIST [30]. One way is to change the rotation offset in each 
round in ShiftRows based on the RRAM PUF response. In the ShiftRows step, row 0 is 
shifted by C0 bytes, row 1 is shifted by C1 bytes, row 2 is shifted by C2 bytes and row 3 is 
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shifted by C3 bytes. For diffusion optimality, C0, C1, C2, C3 have to be different [30]. 
When the block length is 128 bits, C0, C1, C2 and C3 are chosen to be 0, 1, 2 and 3 for all 
the rounds. In the proposed method, different values of C0, C1, C2 and C3 can be used in 
different rounds. For instance in round k, C0, C1, C2 and C3 can be set to 2, 3, 1, 0, while 
in round k+1, they can be set to some other set of values such as 3, 2, 0, 1. In the decryp-
tion module, the InvShiftRows function shifts the rows so that the effect of the shift in 
ShiftRows is annulled. The effect of the proposed variable offset based method can also 
be evaluated on different types of attacks. These include differential power analysis 
(DPA) attacks and fault injection attacks. 
Further the proposed multi cell per bit architecture can also be applied to the existing 
RRAM PUF architectures which have a high degree of uniqueness but reduced reliability 
with increasing time. In [67], two RRAM PUF arrays are programmed into HRS state to 
utilize the variability of RRAM PUF. For every challenge, two values are read out from 
the two arrays and compared. The comparison information is then used to derive the re-
sponse bit. This method achieves Inter-Hamming distance of 50% with minimal hardware 
overhead but its Intra-Hamming Distance degrades over time. The proposed multi cell/bit 
architecture can be used to compensate for the degradation. 
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